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Abstract. A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation,
even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used
in evolutionary game theory to study the spreading and disappearance of strategies. In this paper, it
is shown that success-driven motion can trigger such local agglomeration and may, therefore, be used
to supplement other mechanisms supporting cooperation, like reputation or punishment. Success-driven
motion is formulated here as a function of the game-theoretical payoﬀs. It can change the outcome and
dynamics of spatial games dramatically, in particular as it causes attractive or repulsive interaction forces.
These forces act when the spatial distributions of strategies are inhomogeneous. However, even when
starting with homogeneous initial conditions, small perturbations can trigger large inhomogeneities by
a pattern-formation instability, when certain conditions are fulﬁlled. Here, these instability conditions
are studied for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that
asymmetrical diﬀusion can drive social, economic, and biological systems into the unstable regime, if these
would be stable without diﬀusion.
PACS. 02.50.Le Decision theory and game theory – 87.23.Ge Dynamics of social systems – 82.40.Ck
Pattern formation in reactions with diﬀusion, ﬂow and heat transfer – 87.23.Cc Population dynamics and
ecological pattern formation
1 Introduction
Game theory is a well-established theory of individual
strategic interactions with applications in sociology, eco-
nomics, and biology [1–6], and with many publications
even in physics (see Ref. [7] for an overview). It dis-
tinguishes diﬀerent behaviors, so-called strategies i, and
expresses the interactions of individuals in terms of pay-
oﬀs Pij . The value Pij quantiﬁes the result of an interac-
tion between strategies i and j for the individual pursuing
strategy i. The more favorable the outcome of the inter-
action, the higher is the payoﬀ Pij .
There are many diﬀerent games, depending on the
structure of the payoﬀs, the social interaction network,
the number of interaction partners, the frequency of in-
teraction, and so on [4,5]. Theoretical predictions for the
selection of strategies mostly assume a rational choice ap-
proach, i.e. a payoﬀ maximization by the individuals, al-
though experimental studies [8–10] support conditional
cooperativity [11] and show that moral sentiments [12]
can support cooperation. Some models also take into ac-
count learning (see, e.g. [13] and references therein), where
it is common to assume that more successful behaviors
are imitated (copied). Based on a suitable speciﬁcation
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of the imitation rules, it can be shown [14–16] that the
resulting dynamics can be described by game-dynamical
equations [17,18], which agree with replicator equations
for the ﬁtness-dependent reproduction of individuals in
biology [19–21].
Another ﬁeld where the quantiﬁcation of human be-
havior in terms of mathematical models has been ex-
tremely successful concerns the dynamics of pedestrians
[22], crowds [23], and traﬃc [24]. The related studies have
led to fundamental insights into observed self-organization
phenomena such as stop-and-go waves [24] or lanes of
uniform walking direction [22]. In the meantime, there
are many empirical [25] and experimental results [26,27],
which made it possible to come up with well calibrated
models of human motion [28,29].
Therefore, it would be interesting to know what hap-
pens if game theoretical models are combined with models
of driven motion. Would we also observe self-organization
phenomena in space and time? This is the main ques-
tion addressed in this paper. Under keywords such as
“assortment” and “network reciprocity”, it has been dis-
cussed that the clustering of cooperators can amplify co-
operation, in particular in the prisoner’s dilemma [30–33].
Therefore, the pattern formation instability is of prime
importance to understand the emergence of cooperation
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between individuals. In Section 4, we will study the in-
stability conditions for the prisoner’s dilemma and the
snowdrift game. Moreover, we will see that games with
success-driven motion and asymmetrical diﬀusion may
show pattern formation, where a homogeneous distribu-
tion of strategies would be stable without the presence
of diﬀusion. It is quite surprising that sources of noise
like diﬀusion can support the self-organization in systems,
which can be described by game-dynamical equations with
success-driven motion. This includes social, economic, and
biological systems.
We now proceed as follows: In Section 2, we introduce
the game-dynamical replicator equation for the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD) and the snow-drift game (SD). In partic-
ularly, we discuss the stationary solutions and their sta-
bility, with the conclusion that cooperation is expected to
disappear in the prisoner’s dilemma. In Section 3, we ex-
tend the game-dynamical equation by the consideration
of spatial interactions, success-driven motion, and diﬀu-
sion. Section 3.1 compares the resulting equations with
reaction-diﬀusion-advection equations and discusses the
similarities and diﬀerences with Turing instabilities and
diﬀerential ﬂow-induced chemical instabilities (DIFICI).
Afterwards, Section 4 analyzes the pattern formation in-
stability for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift
game with its interesting implications, while details of
the instability analysis are provided in Appendix B. Fi-
nally, Section 5 studies the driving forces of the dynamics
in cases of large deviations from stationary and homoge-
neous strategy distributions, before Section 6 summarizes
the paper and presents an outlook.
2 The prisoner’s dilemma without spatial
interactions
In order to grasp the major impact of success-driven mo-
tion and diﬀusion on the dynamics of games (see Sect. 3),
it is useful to investigate ﬁrst the game-dynamical equa-
tions without spatial interactions. For this, we represent
the proportion of individuals using a strategy i at time t by
pi(t). While the discussion can be extended to any num-
ber of strategies, we will focus on the case of two strategies
only for the sake of analytical tractability. Here, i = 1 shall
correspond to the cooperative strategy, i = 2 to defection
(cheating or free-riding). According to the deﬁnition of
probabilities, we have 0 ≤ pi(t) ≤ 1 for i ∈ {1, 2} and the
normalization condition
p1(t) + p2(t) = 1 . (1)
Let Pij be the payoﬀ, if strategy i meets strategy j. Then,
the expected payoﬀ for someone applying strategy i is
Ei(t) =
2∑
j=1
Pijpj(t) , (2)
as pj(t) represents the proportion of strategy j, with which
the payoﬀs Pij must be weighted. The average payoﬀ in
the population of individuals is
E(t) =
2∑
l=1
El(t)pl(t) =
2∑
l=1
2∑
j=1
pl(t)Pljpj(t) . (3)
In the game-dynamical equations, the temporal increase
dpi(t)/dt of the proportion of individuals using strategy
i is proportional to the number of individuals pursuing
strategy i who may imitate, i.e. basically to pi(t). The
proportionality factor, i.e. the growth rate λ(i, t), is given
by the diﬀerence between the expected payoﬀ Ei(t) and
the average payoﬀ E(t):
dpi(t)
dt
= λ(i, t)pi(t) =
[
Ei(t)− E(t)
]
pi(t)
=
( 2∑
j=1
Pijpj(t)−
2∑
l=1
2∑
j=1
pl(t)Pljpj(t)
)
pi(t) . (4)
The equations (4) are known as replicator equations. They
were originally developed in evolutionary biology to de-
scribe the spreading of “ﬁtter” individuals through their
higher reproductive success [19–21]. However, the repli-
cator equations were also used in game theory, where
they are called “game-dynamical equations” [17,18]. For
a long time, it was not clear whether or why these equa-
tions could be applied to the frequency pi(t) of behavioral
strategies, but it has been shown that the equations can be
derived from Boltzmann-like equations for imitative pair
interactions of individuals, if “proportional imitation” or
similar imitation rules are assumed [14–16].
Note that one may add a mutation term to the right-
hand side of the game-dynamical equations (4). This term
could, for example, be speciﬁed as
W2p2(t)−W1p1(t) = rq[1 − p1(t)]− r(1 − q)p1(t)
= r[q − p1(t)] (5)
for strategy i = 1, and by the negative expression of this
for i = 2. Here, r is the overall mutation rate, W2 = rq the
mutation rate towards cooperation, and W1 = r(1−q) the
mutation rate towards defection [16]. This implementation
reﬂects spontaneous, random strategy choices due to erro-
neous or exploration behavior and modiﬁes the stationary
solutions.
It can be shown that
2∑
i=1
dpi(t)
dt
= 0 , (6)
so that the normalization condition (1) is fulﬁlled at all
times t, if it is fulﬁlled at t = 0. Moreover, the equa-
tion dpi(t)/dt = λpi(t) implies pi(t) ≥ 0 at all times t, if
pi(0) ≥ 0 for all strategies i.
We may now insert the payoﬀs of the prisoner’s
dilemma, i.e.
P11 = R (“reward”),
P12 = S (“sucker’s payoﬀ”),
P21 = T (“temptation”), and
P22 = P (“payoﬀ”) (7)
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with the assumed payoﬀ relationships
T > R > P > S . (8)
Additionally, one often requires
2R > S + T . (9)
The “reward” R is the payoﬀ for mutual cooperation
and the “punishment” P the payoﬀ for mutual defection,
while T is the “temptation” of unilateral defection, and a
cheated cooperator receives the sucker’s payoﬀ S. While
we have P > S in the prisoner’s dilemma, the snowdrift
game (also known as chicken or hawk-dove game) is char-
acterized by S > P , i.e. it is deﬁned by
T > R > S > P . (10)
Both games are characterized by a temptation to defect
(T > R), while the prisoner’s dilemma has the additional
challenge that there is a high risk to cooperate (S < P ).
This diﬀerence has a large inﬂuence on the resulting level
p1(t) of cooperation: Inserting the above payoﬀs into equa-
tion (4), one eventually obtains the game-dynamical equa-
tion
dp1(t)
dt
= [1− p1(t)]
[− A + Bp1(t)
]
p1(t) . (11)
This directly follows from equation (A.2) of Appendix A,
when the abbreviations
A = P − S and B = P + R − S − T (12)
are used to pronounce the equation’s structure. Setting
dp1(t)/dt = 0, one obviously ﬁnds three stationary solu-
tions p1(t) = pk1 , namely
p11 = 0 , p
2
1 = 1 and p
3
1 =
A
B
. (13)
Not all of these solutions are stable with respect to small
deviations. In fact, a linear stability analysis (see Ap-
pendix A) delivers the eigenvalues
λ1 = −A, λ2 = A−B, and λ3 = A
(
1− A
B
)
.
(14)
The stationary solution pk1 is stable with respect to per-
turbations (i.e. small deviations from them), if λk ≤ 0,
while for λk > 0, the deviation will grow in time. Due to
A−B = T −R > 0 , (15)
the solution p21 = 1 corresponding to 100% cooperators
is unstable with respect to perturbations, i.e. it will not
persist. Moreover, the solution p11 will be stable in the
prisoner’s dilemma because of A = P − S > 0. This cor-
responds to 0% cooperators and 100% defectors, which
agrees with the expected result for the one-shot prisoner’s
dilemma (if individuals decide according to rational choice
theory). In the snowdrift game, however, the stationary
solution p11 = 0 is unstable due to A = P − S < 0, while
the additional stationary solution p31 = A/B < 1 is sta-
ble. Hence, in the snowdrift game with B < A < 0, we
expect the establishment of a fraction A/B of coopera-
tors. For the prisoner’s dilemma, the solution p31 does not
exist, as it does not fall into the range between 0 and
1 that is required from probabilities: If B > 0, we have
p31 = A/B > 1, while p
3
1 = A/B < 0 for B < 0.
In summary, for the prisoner’s dilemma, there is no
evolutionarily stable solution with a finite percentage of
cooperators, if we do not consider spontaneous strategy
mutations (and neglect the eﬀect of spatial correlations
through the applied factorization assumption). According
to the above, cooperation in the PD is essentially expected
to disappear. Strategy mutations, of course, can increase
the stable level p11 of cooperation from zero to a ﬁnite
value. Speciﬁcally, p11 will assume a value close to zero for
small values of r, while it will converge to q in the limit
r →∞.
In the next section, we will show that
1. when the proportions of cooperators and defectors are
allowed to vary in space, i.e. if the distribution of coop-
erators and defectors is inhomogeneous, the proportion
of cooperators may locally grow,
2. we obtain such a variation in space by success-driven
motion, as it can destabilize a homogeneous distribu-
tion of strategies, which gives rise to spatial pattern
formation in the population (agglomeration or segre-
gation or both [49]).
Together with the well-known fact that a clustering of co-
operators can promote cooperation [30–33], pattern for-
mation can potentially amplify the level of cooperation,
as was demonstrated numerically for a somewhat related
model in reference [34].1 We will also show that, in con-
trast to success-driven motion, random motion (“diﬀu-
sion” in space) stabilizes the stationary solution p11 with
0% cooperators (or, in the presence of strategy mutations,
with a small percentage of cooperators).
3 Taking into account success-driven motion
and diﬀusion in space
We now assume that individuals are distributed over dif-
ferent locations x ∈ [0, L] of a one-dimensional space. A
generalization to multi-dimensional spaces is easily possi-
ble. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the spatial
1 In contrast to this EPJB paper, the one published in Ad-
vances in Complex Systems (ACS) studies the dynamics in
a two-dimensional grid, assuming spatial exclusion (i.e. a cell
can only be occupied once), neglecting eﬀects of noise and dif-
fusion, and choosing the payoﬀs P = S = 0, which restricts
the results to a degenerate case of the prisoner’s dilemma and
the snowdrift game. Moreover, this EPJB paper focuses on the
pattern formation instability rather than the ampliﬁcation of
the level of cooperation, formalizes social forces resulting from
success-driven motion, and discusses pattern formation in the
spatial prisoner’s dilemma induced by asymmetrical diﬀusion.
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variable x is scaled by the spatial extension L, so that x is
dimensionless and varies between 0 and 1. In the follow-
ing, the proportion of individuals using strategy i at time
t and at a location between x and x + dx is represented
by pi(x, t)dx with pi(x, t) ≥ 0. Due to the spatial degrees
of freedom, the proportion of defectors is not immediately
given by the the proportion of cooperators anymore, and
the previous normalization condition p2(t) = 1 − p1(t) is
replaced by the less restrictive condition
2∑
i=1
L∫
0
dx pi(x, t) = 1 . (16)
This allows the fractions of cooperators and defectors to
uncouple locally, i.e. the proportion of cooperators does
not have to decrease anymore by the same amount as the
proportion of defectors increases.
Note that, if ρi(x, t) = pi(x, t)N/L represents the den-
sity of individuals pursuing strategy i at location x and
time t, equation (16) can be transferred into the form
2∑
i=1
1∫
0
dx ρi(x, t) =
N
L
= ρ , (17)
where N is the total number of individuals in the system
and ρ their average density.
One may also consider to treat unoccupied space for-
mally like a third strategy i = 0. In this case, however, the
probabilities pi(x, t) in all locations x add up to the max-
imum concentration pmax, see equation (23). This means
p0(x, t) = pmax − p1(x, t)− p2(x, t) (18)
and
∂p0(x, t)
∂t
= −∂p1(x, t)
∂t
− ∂p2(x, t)
∂t
. (19)
Therefore, p0(x, t) can be eliminated from the system of
equations, because unoccupied space does not interact
with strategies 1 and 2. As a consequence, the dynamics
in spatial games with success-driven motion is diﬀerent
from the cyclic dynamics in games considering volunteer-
ing [35]: In order to survive invasion attempts by defectors
in the prisoner’s dilemma, one could think that coopera-
tors would seek separated locations, where they would be
“loners”. However, cooperators do not tend to maneuver
themselves into non-interactive states [34]: On the con-
trary: The survival of cooperators rather requires to have
a larger average number of interaction partners than de-
fectors have.
After this introductory discussion, let us now extend
the game-dynamical equations according to
∂pi(x, t)
∂t
=
( 2∑
l=1
pl
2∑
j=1
Pijpj −
2∑
l=1
2∑
j=1
plPljpj
)
pi(x, t)
− ∂
∂x
(
pi(x, t)
∂Ei(x, t)
∂x
)
+ Di
∂2pi(x, t)
∂x2
(20)
with the local expected success
Ei(x, t) =
2∑
j=1
Pijpj(x, t) , (21)
compare equation (2). The additional sum
∑
l pl had to be
introduced for reasons of normalization, as we do not have
p1 + p2 = 1 any longer.2 ∂pi(x, t)/∂t represents the (par-
tial) time derivative. The ﬁrst term in large brackets on
the right-hand side of equation (20) assumes that locally,
an imitation of more successful strategies occurs. An ex-
tension of the model to interactions with neighboring loca-
tions would be easily possible. The second term, which de-
pends on Ei(x, t), describes success-driven motion [36,37].
Finally, the last term represents diﬀusion, and Di ≥ 0 are
called diﬀusion coeﬃcients or diﬀusivities. These terms
can be generalized to multi-dimensional spaces by replac-
ing the spatial derivative ∂/∂x by the nabla operator ∇.
The notion of success-driven motion is justiﬁed for the
following reason: Comparing the term describing success-
driven motion with a Fokker-Planck equation [38], one can
conclude that it corresponds to a systematic drift with
speed
Vi(x, t) =
∂Ei(x, t)
∂x
. (22)
According to this, individuals move into the direction of
the gradient of the expected payoﬀ, i.e. the direction of
the (greatest) increase of Ei(x, t). In order to take into ac-
count capacity constraints (saturation eﬀects), one could
introduce a prefactor
C(x, t) = 1−
2∑
l=1
pl(x, t)N
ρmaxL
≥ 0 , (23)
where ρmax = pmaxN/L ≥ N/L > 0 represents the maxi-
mum density of individuals. This would have to be done
in the imitation-based replicator terms in the ﬁrst line of
equation (20) as well. In the following, however, we will
focus on the case C = 1, which allows for a local accumu-
lation of individuals.
The last term in equation (20) is a diﬀusion term
which reﬂects eﬀects of random motion in space [38]. It
can be easily seen that, for Di > 0, the diﬀusion term
has a smoothing eﬀect: It eventually reduces the propor-
tion pi(x, t) in places x where the second spatial derivative
∂2pi/∂x
2 is negative, in particular in places x where the
distribution pi(x, t) has maxima in space. In contrast, the
proportion pi(x, t) increases in time, where ∂2pi/∂x2 > 0,
2 Rather than multiplying the ﬁrst sum over j in equation
(20) by
∑
l pl, one could also divide the second sum over j by∑
l pl, corresponding to a subtraction of the average expected
success
∑
l plEl/
∑
l pl from the expected success Ei. The al-
ternative speciﬁcation chosen here assumes that the number of
strategic game-theoretical interactions of an individual per unit
time is proportional to the number of individuals it may inter-
act with, i.e. proportional to
∑
l pl(x, t). Both speciﬁcations
are consistent with the game-dynamical equation (4), where∑
l pl(t) = 1.
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e.g. where the distribution has its minima. Assuming an
additional smoothing term
D0
∂4pi(x, t)
∂x4
(24)
with a small constant D0 > 0 on the right-hand side of
equation (20) makes the numerical solution of this model
well-behaved (see Appendix B).
When equation (20) is solved, one may, for exam-
ple, assume periodic boundary conditions (i.e. a circu-
lar space). In this case, we have pi(1, t) = pi(0, t) and
∂kpi(1, t)/∂xk = ∂kpi(0, t)/∂xk, and by means of partial
integration, it can be shown that
∂
∂t
2∑
i=1
1∫
0
dx pi(x, t) = 0 . (25)
Therefore, equation (20) fulﬁls the normalization condi-
tion (16) at all times, if it is satisﬁed at t = 0. Further-
more, it can be shown that pi(x, t) ≥ 0 for all times t, if
this is true at time t = 0 for all strategies i and locations
x.
3.1 Comparison with reaction-diﬀusion-advection
equations
It is noteworthy that the extended game-dynamical model
(20) has some similarity with reaction-diﬀusion-advection
(RDA) equations. These equations have been developed to
describe the dynamics of chemical reactions with spatial
gradients, considering the eﬀects of diﬀerential ﬂows and
diﬀusion. Speciﬁcally, the kinetics of (binary) chemical re-
actions is reﬂected by non-linear terms similar to those in
the ﬁrst line on the right-hand side of equation (20). The
ﬁrst term in the second line represents advection terms
(diﬀerential ﬂows), while the last term of equation (20)
delineates diﬀusion eﬀects.
Considering this apparent similarity, what dynamics
do we expect? It is known that reaction-diﬀusion equa-
tions can show a Turing instability [39,40] (also without
an advection term). Speciﬁcally, for a chemical activator-
inhibitor system, one can ﬁnd a linearly unstable dynam-
ics, if the diﬀusivities D1 and D2 are diﬀerent. As a con-
sequence, the concentration of chemicals in space will be
non-homogeneous. This eﬀect has been used to explain
pattern formation processes in morphogenesis [41,42]. Be-
sides the Turing instability, a second pattern-forming in-
stability can occur when chemical reactions are coupled
with diﬀerential ﬂows. These so-called “diﬀerential ﬂow-
induced chemical instabilities” (DIFICI) can occur even
for equal or vanishing diﬀusivities Di = D, but they may
also interact with the Turing instability [43–47].
The diﬀerence of the extended game-dynamical equa-
tion (20) as compared to the RDA equations lies in the
speciﬁcation of the velocity Vi(x, t), which is determined
by the gradient of the expected success Ei(x, t). There-
fore, the advective term is self-generated by the success
of the players. We may rewrite the corresponding term in
equation (20) as follows:
− ∂
∂x
(
pi
∂Ei
∂x
)
= −
2∑
j=1
Pij
∂pi
∂x
∂pj
∂x
−
2∑
j=1
piPij
∂2pj
∂x2
.
(26)
According to the last term of this equation, the advec-
tion term related to success-driven motion implies eﬀects
similar to a diﬀusion term with negative diﬀusion coef-
ﬁcients piPij (if Pij > 0). Additionally, there is a non-
linear dependence on the gradients ∂pi/∂x and ∂pj/∂x of
the strategy distributions in space. Both terms couple the
dynamics of diﬀerent strategies j.
As a consequence of this, the resulting instability con-
ditions and dynamics are diﬀerent from the RDA equa-
tions. We will show that, without success-driven mo-
tion, diﬀusion cannot trigger pattern formation. Diﬀusion
rather counteracts spatial inhomogeneities. Success-driven
motion, in contrast, causes pattern formation in a large
area of the parameter space of payoﬀs, partly because of
a negative diﬀusion eﬀect.
Besides this, we will show that diﬀerent diﬀusivities Di
may trigger a pattern formation instability in case of pay-
oﬀ parameters, for which success-driven motion does not
destabilize homogeneous strategy distributions in the ab-
sence of diﬀusion. This counter-intuitive eﬀect reminds of
the Turing instability, although the underlying mathemat-
ical model is diﬀerent, as pointed out before. In particular,
the largest growth rate does not occur for ﬁnite wave num-
bers, as Appendix B shows. The instability for asymmetric
diﬀusion is rather related to the problem of “noise-induced
transitions” in systems with multiplicative noise, which
are characterized by space-dependent diﬀusion coeﬃcients
[48]. A further interesting aspect of success-driven motion
is the circumstance that the space-dependent diﬀusion ef-
fects go back to binary interactions, as the multiplicative
dependence on pi and pj shows.
4 Linear instability of the prisoner’s dilemma
and the snowdrift game
After inserting the payoﬀs (7) of the prisoner’s dilemma
and the snowdrift game into equation (20), one can see
the favorable eﬀect on the spreading of cooperation that
the spatial dependence, in particular the relaxed normal-
ization condition (16) can have: For i = 1, equation (20)
becomes
∂p1(x, t)
∂t
= p2
[
(R− T )p1 + (S − P )p2
]
p1
+
∂
∂x
[
(D1 − p1R)∂p1
∂x
− p1S ∂p2
∂x
]
. (27)
It is now an interesting question, whether the agglomer-
ation of cooperators can be supported by success-driven
motion. In fact, the second line of equation (27) can be
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rewritten as
(D1 − p1R)∂
2p1
∂x2
−R
(
∂p1
∂x
)2
− p1S ∂
2p2
∂x2
− S ∂p1
∂x
∂p2
∂x
.
(28)
This shows that a curvature ∂2pi/∂x2 < 0 can support the
increase of the proportion of strategy i as compared to the
game-dynamical equation (4) without spatial dependence.
The situation becomes even clearer, if a linear stability
analysis of equations (27) is performed (see Appendix B).
The result is as follows: If the square of the wave number κ,
which relates to the curvature of the strategy distribution,
is large enough (i.e. if the related cluster size is suﬃciently
small), the replicator terms in the ﬁrst line on the right-
hand side of equation (20) become negligible. Therefore,
the conditions, under which homogeneous initial strategy
distributions p0i are linearly unstable, simplify to
p01R + p
0
2P > D1 + D2 (29)
and
(p01R−D1)(p02P −D2) < p01p02ST , (30)
see equations (A.30) and (A.31).3
If condition (29) or condition (30) is fulﬁlled, we ex-
pect emergent spatio-temporal pattern formation, basi-
cally agglomeration or segregation or both [49]. As has
been pointed out before, the agglomeration of coopera-
tors can increase the level of cooperation. This eﬀect is
not possible, when spatial interactions are neglected. In
that case, we stay with equation (11), and the favorable
pattern-formation eﬀect cannot occur.
Let us now discuss a variety of diﬀerent cases:
1. In case of diﬀusive motion only (i.e. no success-driven
motion), equation (29) must be replaced by
0 > D1 + D2 (31)
and equation (30) by
D1D2 < 0 , (32)
which cannot be fulﬁlled. Therefore, diﬀusion without
success-driven motion does not support pattern forma-
tion or a related increase in the level of cooperation.
2. In the case of success-driven motion with ﬁnite diﬀu-
sion, equations (29) and (30) imply
p01R + (1− p01)P > D1 + D2 (33)
and
(p01R−D1)
[
(1− p01)P −D2
]
< p01(1− p01)ST , (34)
3 This instability condition has been studied in the context
of success-driven motion without imitation and for games with
symmetrical payoﬀ matrices (i.e. Pij = Pji), which show a
particular behavior [49]. Over here, in contrast, we investigate
continuous spatial games involving imitation (selection of more
successful strategies), and focus on asymmetrical games such
as the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game (see Sect.
4), which behave very diﬀerently.
if the normalization condition p02 = 1 − p01 for a
homogeneous initial condition is taken into account.
These instability conditions hold for both, the pris-
oner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. Inequality
(33) basically says that, in order to ﬁnd spontaneous
pattern formation, the agglomerative tendency R of co-
operators or the agglomerative tendency P of defectors
(or both) must be larger than the diﬀusive tendency.
This agglomeration, of course, requires the reward R
of cooperation to be positive, otherwise cooperators
would not like to stay in the same location. The al-
ternative instability condition (34) requires that the
product RP of the payoﬀs resulting when individuals
of the same strategy meet each other is smaller than
the product ST of payoﬀs resulting when individuals
with diﬀerent strategies meet each other. This basi-
cally excludes a coexistence of the two strategies in the
same location and is expected to cause segregation. It
is noteworthy that condition (34) is not invariant with
respect to shifts of all payoﬀs Pij by a constant value
c, in contrast to the replicator equations (A.2).
3. In case of the prisoner’s dilemma without strategy
mutations, the stable stationary solution for the case
without spontaneous strategy changes is p01 = p11 = 0.
This simpliﬁes the instability conditions further, yield-
ing
P > D1 + D2 (35)
and
−D1(P −D2) < 0 . (36)
In order to fulﬁl one of these conditions, the punish-
ment P must be positive and larger than D2 to support
pattern formation (here: an aggregation of defectors).
Naturally, the survival or spreading of cooperators re-
quires the initial existence of a ﬁnite proportion p01 > 0
of them, see the previous case.
4. In the special case P = S = 0 [34], equations (33) and
(34) become
p01R > D1 + D2 (37)
and
−(p01R−D1)D2 < 0 , (38)
which requires p01R > D1. Therefore, a ﬁnite initial
proportion p01 of cooperators is needed again for pat-
tern formation (an agglomeration of cooperators). This
can be easily reached by spontaneous strategy changes.
5. Neglecting diﬀusion for a moment (i.e. setting D1 =
D2 = 0), no pattern formation should occur, if the
condition
RP > ST (39)
and, at the same time,
p01R + (1− p01)P < 0 (40)
is fulﬁlled. Equation (39) implies the stability condi-
tion
S <
RP
T
. (41)
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Besides T > R, we have to consider here that S < P
in the prisoner’s dilemma and S > P in the snowdrift
game (see Fig. 1).4
6. Finally, let us assume that the stability conditions
ST −RP < 0 and p01R+(1−p01)P < 0 for the previous
case without diﬀusion (D1 = D2 = 0) are fulfilled, so
that no patterns will emerge. Then, depending on the
parameter values, the instability condition following
from equation (34),
−(D1 −D2) (1− p01)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
P
< D2︸︷︷︸
≥0
[p01R + (1− p01)P ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−D1D2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+ p01(1− p01)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(ST −RP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
, (42)
may still be matched, if (D1−D2) is suﬃciently large.
Therefore, symmetrical diﬀusion (D1 = D2) can trig-
ger a pattern formation instability, where the spatio-
temporal strategy distribution without diﬀusion would
be stable. The situation is clearly diﬀerent for symmet-
rical diﬀusion with D1 = D2, which cannot support
pattern formation.
Although the instability due to asymmetrical diﬀusion
reminds of the Turing instability, it must be distin-
guished from it (see Sect. 3.1). So, how can the in-
stability then be explained? The reason for it may be
imagined as follows: In order to survive and spread, co-
operators need to be able to agglomerate locally and
to invade new locations. While the ﬁrst requirement
is supported by success-driven motion, the last one is
promoted by a larger diﬀusivity D1 > D2 of coopera-
tors.
5 Social forces in spatial games with
success-driven motion
In the previous section, we have shown how success-driven
motion destabilizes homogeneous strategy distributions in
space. This analysis was based on the study of linear
(in)stability (see Appendix B). But what happens, when
4 Strictly speaking, we also need to take into account equa-
tion (40), which implies P < 0 for the stationary solution
p01 = p
1
1 = 0 of the prisoner’s dilemma and generally P <
−p01R/(1 − p01). In case of the snowdrift game [50], it is ade-
quate to insert the stationary solution p01 = p
3
1 = A/B, which is
stable in case of no spatial interactions. This leads to the con-
dition P < −p31R/(1−p31) = AR/(A−B) = (P −S)R/(T−R),
i.e. SR < (2R − T )P . The question is, whether this condition
will reduce the previously determined area of stability given by
S < RP/T with P < 0, see equation (41) and Figure 1. This
would be the case, if (2− T/R)P > RP/T , which by multipli-
cation with RT/P becomes (2RT −T 2) > R2 or (T −R)2 < 0.
Since this condition cannot be fulﬁlled, it does not impose any
further restrictions on the stability area in the snowdrift game.
Fig. 1. Payoﬀ-dependence of pattern-formation in the pris-
oner’s dilemma with S < P and the snowdrift game with
S > P according to a linear stability analysis for spatial games
with success-driven motion, but no diﬀusion, strategy muta-
tions, or noise. One can clearly see that spontaneous pattern-
formation prevails (green area), and that there is only a small
area for P < 0 (marked red), where a homogeneous initial
condition is stable with respect to small perturbations.
the deviation from the homogeneous strategy distribution
is large, i.e. the gradients ∂pi/∂x are not negligible any
longer? This can be answered by writing equation (22)
explicitly, which becomes
Vi(x, t) =
2∑
j=1
Pij
∂pj(x, t)
∂x
=
2∑
j=1
fij(x, t) . (43)
Here, the expression
fij(x, t) = Pij
∂pj(x, t)
∂x
(44)
(which can be extended by saturation eﬀects), may be in-
terpreted as interaction force (“social force”) excerted by
individuals using strategy j on an individual using strat-
egy i.5 It is visible that the sign of Pij determines the
character of the force. The force is attractive for posi-
tive payoﬀs Pij > 0 and repulsive for negative payoﬀs
5 Note that this identiﬁcation of a speed with a force is some-
times used for dissipative motion of the kind mαd
2xα/dt
2 =
−γαdxα/dt + ∑β Fαβ(t), where xα(t) is the location of an in-
dividual α, the “mass” mα reﬂects inertia, γα is a friction
coeﬃcient, and Fαβ(t) are interaction forces. In the limit-
ing case mα → 0, we can make the adiabatic approximation
dxα/dt =
∑
β Fαβ(t)/γα =
∑
β fαβ(t), where dxα/dt is a speed
and fαβ(t) are proportional to the interaction forces Fαβ(t).
Hence, the quantities fαβ(t) are sometimes called “forces”
themselves.
352 The European Physical Journal B
Pij < 0. The direction of the force, however, is determined
by spatial changes ∂pj(x, t)/∂x in the strategy distribu-
tion pj(x, t) (i.e. not by the strategy distribution itself).
It is not the size of the payoﬀs Pij which determines
the strength of the interaction force, but the payoﬀ times
the gradient of the distribution of the strategy j one in-
teracts with (and the availability and reachability of more
favorable neighboring locations, if the saturation prefactor
C is taken into account). Due to the dependence on the
gradient ∂pj(x, t)/∂x, the impact of a dispersed strategy
j on individuals using strategy i is negligible. This partic-
ularly applies to scenarios with negative self-interactions
(Pjj < 0).
Note that success-driven motion may be caused by re-
pulsion away from the current location or by attraction
towards more favorable neighborhoods. In the prisoner’s
dilemma, for example, cooperators and defectors feel a
strong attraction towards areas with a higher proportion
of cooperators. However, cooperators seek each other mu-
tually, while the attraction between defectors and cooper-
ators is weaker. This is due to T + S < 2R, see inequality
(9). As a result, even if P > 0, cooperators are moving
away from defectors due to R > P in order to ﬁnd more
cooperative locations, while defectors are following them.
Another interesting case is the game with the payoﬀs
P11 = P22 = −P and P12 = P21 = Q > P , where we have
negative self-interactions among identical strategies and
positive interactions between diﬀerent strategies. Simula-
tions for the no-imitation case show that, despite of the
dispersive tendency of each strategy, strategies tend to ag-
glomerate in certain locations thanks to the stronger at-
tractive interactions between diﬀerent strategies (see Fig.
3 in Ref. [37]).
The idea of social forces is long-standing. Montroll
used the term to explain logistic growth laws [51], and
Lewin introduced the concept of social ﬁelds to the so-
cial sciences in analogy to electrical ﬁelds in physics [52].
However, a formalization of a widely applicable social force
concept was missing for a long time. In the meantime, so-
cial forces were successfully used to describe the dynamics
of interacting vehicles [24] or pedestrians [22], but there,
the attractive or repulsive nature was just assumed. At-
tempts to systematically derive social forces from an un-
derlying decision mechanism were based on direct pair in-
teractions in behavioral spaces (e.g. opinion spaces), with
the observation that imitative interactions or the readi-
ness for compromises had attractive eﬀects [16,53]. Here,
for the ﬁrst time, we present a formulation of social forces
in game-theoretical terms. Considering the great variety of
diﬀerent games, depending on the respective speciﬁcation
of the payoﬀs Pij , this is expected to ﬁnd a wide range
of applications, in particular as success-driven motion has
been found to produce interesting and relevant pattern
formation phenomena [34,37].
6 Summary, discussion, and outlook
In this paper, we have started from the game-dynamical
equations (replicator equation), which can be derived from
imitative pair interactions between individuals [14,15]. It
has been shown that no cooperation is expected in the
prisoner’s dilemma, if no spontaneous strategy mutations
are taken into account, otherwise there will be a signiﬁ-
cant, but usually low level of cooperation. In the snowdrift
game, in contrast, the stationary solution corresponding
to no cooperation is unstable, and there is a stable solution
with a ﬁnite level of cooperation.
These considerations have been carried out to illus-
trate the major diﬀerence that the introduction of spa-
tial interactions based on success-driven motion and dif-
fusion makes. While diﬀusion itself tends to support ho-
mogeneous strategy distributions rather than pattern for-
mation, success-driven motion implies an unstable spatio-
temporal dynamics under a wide range of conditions. As
a consequence, small ﬂuctuations can destabilize a homo-
geneous distribution of strategies. Under such conditions,
the formation of emergent patterns (agglomeration, segre-
gation, or both) is expected. The resulting dynamics may
be understood in terms of social forces, which have been
formulated here in game-theoretical terms.
The destabilization of homogeneous strategy distribu-
tions and the related occurrence of spontaneous pattern
formation has, for example, a great importance for the
survival and spreading of cooperators in the prisoner’s
dilemma. While this has been studied numerically in the
past [34], future work based on the model of this paper and
extensions of it shall analytically study conditions for the
promotion of cooperation. For example, it will be interest-
ing to investigate, how relevant the imitation of strategies
in neighboring locations is, how important is the rate of
strategy changes as compared to location changes, and
how crucial is a territorial eﬀect (i.e. a limitation pmax of
the local concentration of individuals, which may protect
cooperators from invasion by defectors).
Of course, instead of studying the continuous game-
dynamical model with success-driven motion and calculat-
ing its instability conditions, one can also perform agent-
based simulations for a discretized version of the model.
For the case without imitation of superior strategies and
symmetrical payoﬀs (Pij = Pji), it has been shown that
the analytical instability conditions surprisingly well pre-
dict the parameter areas of the agent-based model, where
pattern-formation takes place [49]. Despite the diﬀerence
in the previously studied model (see footnote 2), this is
also expected to be true for the non-symmetrical games
studied here, in particular as we found that the inﬂuence
of imitation on the instability condition is negligible, if
the wave number κ characterizing inhomogeneities in the
initial distribution is large. This simpliﬁed the stability
analysis a lot. Moreover, it was shown that asymmetri-
cal diﬀusion can drive our game-theoretical model with
success-driven motion from the stable regime into the un-
stable regime. While this reminds of the Turing insta-
bility [39], it is actually diﬀerent from it: Compared to
reaction-diﬀusion-advection equations, the equations un-
derlying the game-dynamical model with success-driven
motion belong to another mathematical class, as is elabo-
rated in Section 3.1.
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In Section 5, it was pointed out that, in the pris-
oner’s dilemma, cooperators evade defectors, who seek co-
operators. Therefore, some eﬀects of success-driven mo-
tion (leaving unfavorable neighborhoods) may be inter-
preted as punishment of the previous interaction partners,
who are left behind with a lower overall payoﬀ. However,
“movement punishment” of defectors by leaving unfavor-
able environments is diﬀerent from the “costly” or “altru-
istic punishment” discussed in the literature [54]: In the
strict sense, success-driven motion neither imposes costs
on a moving individual nor on the previous interaction
partners. If we would introduce a cost of movement, it
would have to be paid by both, cooperators who evade de-
fectors, and defectors who follow them. Therefore, costly
motion would be expected to yield similar results as be-
fore, but it would still be diﬀerent from altruistic punish-
ment. It should also be pronounced that, besides avoid-
ing unfavorable locations, success-driven motion implies
the seeking of favorable environments, which has nothing
to do with punishment. Without this element, e.g. when
individuals leave unfavorable locations based on a ran-
dom, diﬀusive motion, success-driven motion is not eﬀec-
tive in promoting cooperation. Therefore, the mechanism
of success-driven motion, despite some similar features, is
clearly to be distinguished from the mechanism of punish-
ment.
Finally, note that migration may be considered as one
realization of success-driven motion. Before, the statistics
of migration behavior was modeled by the gravity law
[55,56] or entropy approaches [57,58], while its dynamics
was described by partial diﬀerential equations [59,60] and
models from statistical physics [61]. The particular poten-
tial of the approach proposed in this paper lies in the inte-
gration of migration into a game-theoretical framework, as
we formalize success-driven motion in terms of payoﬀs and
strategy distributions in space and time. Such integrated
approaches are needed in the social sciences to allow for
consistent interpretations of empirical ﬁndings within a
uniﬁed framework.
The author would like to thank Peter Felten for preparing Fig-
ure 1 and Christoph Hauert for comments on manuscript [34].
Appendix A: Linear stability analysis
of the game-dynamical equation without
spatial interactions
Inserting the payoﬀs (7) of the prisoner’s dilemma or
the snowdrift game into equation (4), we get the game-
dynamical equation
dp1(t)
dt
=
[
Rp1 + Sp2 −R(p1)2
− (S + T )p1p2 − P (p2)2
]
p1(t) . (A.1)
Considering equation (1), i.e. p2(t) = 1− p1(t), we ﬁnd
dp1
dt
=
[
Rp1 + S(1− p1)−R(p1)2
−(S + T )p1(1 − p1)− P (1 − p1)2
]
p1(t)
= (1− p1)
[
(S − P ) + (P + R− S − T )p1
]
p1(t)(A.2)
This is a mean-value equation, which assumes a factoriza-
tion of joint probabilities, i.e. it neglects correlations [16].
Nevertheless, the following analysis is suited to provide
insights into the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma and
the snowdrift game. Introducing the useful abbreviations
A = P − S and B = P + R− S − T, (A.3)
equation (A.2) can be further simpliﬁed, and we get
dp1(t)
dt
= [1− p1(t)]
[−A + Bp1(t)
]
p1(t) . (A.4)
Obviously, shifting all payoﬀs Pij by a constant value c
does not change equation (11), in contrast to the case
involving spatial interactions discussed later.
Let pk1 with k ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote the stationary solu-
tions (13) of equation (11), deﬁned by the requirement
dp1/dt = 0. In order to analyze the stability of these so-
lutions with respect to small deviations
δp1(t) = p1(t)− pk1 , (A.5)
we perform a linear stability analysis in the following. For
this, we insert equation (A.5) into equation 11), which
yields
dδp1(t)
dt
= (1− pk1 − δp1)(−A + Bpk1 + B δp1)(pk1 + δp1)
=
[
(1 − pk1)pk1 + (1− 2pk1)δp1 − (δp1)2
]
× (−A + Bpk1 + B δp1) . (A.6)
If we concentrate on suﬃciently small deviations δp1(t),
terms containing factors [δp1(t)]m with an integer expo-
nent m > 1 can be considered much smaller than terms
containing a factor δp1(t). Therefore, we may linearize the
above equations by dropping higher-order terms propor-
tionally to [δp1(t)]m with m > 1. This gives
dδp1
dt
=
[
(1− pk1)pk1 + (1− 2pk1)δp1(t)
]
(−A + Bpk1)
+(1− pk1)pk1B δp1(t)
=
[
(1− 2pk1)(−A + Bpk1) + (1− pk1)pk1B
]
δp1(t)(A.7)
as (1 − pk1)pk1(−A + Bpk1) = 0 for all stationary solutions
pk1 . With the abbreviation
λk = (1− 2pk1)(−A + Bpk1) + (1 − pk1)pk1B , (A.8)
we can write
dδp1(t)
dt
= λk δp1(t) . (A.9)
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If λk < 0, the deviation δp1(t) will exponentially decay
with time, i.e. the solution will converge to the stationary
solution pk1 , which implies its stability. If λk > 0, however,
the deviation will grow in time, and the stationary solution
pk1 is unstable. For the stationary solutions p
1
1 = 0, p
2
1 = 1,
and p31 = A/B given in equation (13), we can easily ﬁnd
λ1 = −A, λ2 = A−B , and λ3 = A
(
1− A
B
)
,
(A.10)
respectively.
Appendix B: Linear stability analysis
of the model with success-driven motion
and diﬀusion
In order to understand spatio-temporal pattern formation,
it is not enough to formulate the (social) interaction forces
determining the motion of individuals. We also need to
grasp, why spatial patterns can emerge from small per-
turbations, even if the initial distribution of strategies is
uniform (homogeneous) in space.
If equation (20) is written explicitly for i = 1, we get
∂p1
∂t
=
[
(p1 + p2)(P11p1 + P12p2)− P11(p1)2
−(P12 + P21)p1p2 − P22(p2)2
]
p1(x, t)
− ∂
∂x
[
p1
(
P11
∂p1
∂x
+ P12
∂p2
∂x
)]
+ D1
∂2p1
∂x2
(A.11)
The equation for i = 2 looks identical, if only p1(x, t)
and p2(x, t) are exchanged in all places, and the same is
done with the indices 1 and 2. We will now assume a
homogeneous initial condition pi(x, 0) = p0i (i.e. a uni-
form distribution of strategies i in space) and study the
spatio-temporal evolution of the deviations δpi(x, t) =
pi(x, t) − p0i . Let us insert for p01 one of the values pk1 ,
which are stationary solutions of the partial diﬀerential
equation (20), as p02 = (1 − p01) holds for homogeneous
strategy distributions due to the normalization condition
(16). Assuming small deviations δpi(x, t) and linearizing
equation (A.11) by neglecting non-linear terms, we obtain
∂δp1
∂t
=
[
(P11 − P21)p01p02 + (P12 − P22)(p02)2
]
δp1
+
[
(P11 − P21)(p01 δp2 + p02 δp1)
+2(P12 − P22)p02 δp2
]
p01
− p01
(
P11
∂2δp1
∂x2
+ P12
∂2δp2
∂x2
)
+ D1
∂2δp1
∂x2
(A.12)
Again, a mutation term W2δp2(x, t)−W1δp1(x, t) reﬂect-
ing spontaneous strategy changes may be added, see equa-
tion (5). The analogous equation for δp2(x, t) is obtained
by exchanging strategies 1 and 2.
In equation (A.12), it can be easily seen that success-
driven motion with Pij > 0 has a similar functional form,
but the opposite sign as the diﬀusion term. While the
latter causes a homogenization in space, success-driven
motion can cause local agglomeration [37], ﬁrst of all for
Pij > 0.
It is known that linear partial diﬀerential equations
like equation (A.12) are solved by (a superposition of)
functions of the kind
δpi(x, t) = eλ˜t
[
ai cos(κx) + bi sin(κx)
]
, (A.13)
where ai and bi are initial amplitudes, λ˜ = λ˜(κ) is their
growth rate (if positive, or a decay rate, if negative), and
κ = κn = 2πn/L with n ∈ {1, 2, . . .} are possible “wave
numbers”. The “wave length” 2π/κ = L/n may be imag-
ined as the extension of a cluster of strategy i in space.
Obviously, possible wave lengths in case of a circular space
of diameter L = 1 are fractions L/n. The general solution
of equation (A.12) is
δpi(x, t) =
∞∑
n=1
eλ˜(κn)t
[
ai,n cos(κnx) + bi,n sin(κnx)
]
,
(A.14)
i.e. a linear superposition of solutions of the form (A.13)
with all possible wave numbers κn. For t = 0, the expo-
nential prefactor eλ˜(κn)t becomes 1, and equation (A.14)
may then be viewed as the Fourier series of the spatial
dependence of the initial condition δp(i, x, 0). Hence, the
amplitudes ai,n and bi,n correspond to the Euler-Fourier
coeﬃcients [62].
Let us now determine the possible eigenvalues λ˜(κ).
For the ansatz (A.13), we have ∂δpi(x, t)/∂t = λ˜δpi(x, t)
and ∂2δpi(x, t)/∂x2 = −κ2δpi(x, t). Therefore, the lin-
earized equations can be cast into the following form of
an eigenvalue problem with eigenvalues λ˜:
λ˜
⎛
⎝
δp1(x, t)
δp2(x, t)
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝
M11 M12
M21 M22
⎞
⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=M
⎛
⎝
δp1(x, t)
δp2(x, t)
⎞
⎠ . (A.15)
Here, we have introduced the abbreviations
M11 = A11 + (p01P11 −D1)κ2 , (A.16)
M12 = A12 + p01P12κ
2 , (A.17)
M21 = A21 + p02P21κ
2 , (A.18)
M22 = A22 + (p02P22 −D2)κ2 (A.19)
with
A11 =
[
(P12 − P22)p02 + 2(P11 − P21)p01
]
p02 (A.20)
A12 =
[
(P11 − P21)p01 + 2(P12 − P22)p02
]
p01 , (A.21)
A21 =
[
(P22 − P12)p02 + 2(P21 − P11)p01
]
p02 , (A.22)
A22 =
[
(P21 − P11)p01 + 2(P22 − P12)p02
]
p01 (A.23)
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The eigenvalue problem (A.15) can only be solved, if the
determinant of the matrix (M − λ˜1) vanishes, where 1 de-
notes the unit matrix [62]. In other words, λ˜ are solutions
of the so-called “characteristic polynomial”
(M11 − λ˜)(M22 − λ˜)−M12M21
= λ˜2 − (M11 + M22)λ˜ + M11M22 −M12M21 = 0(A.24)
This polynomial is of degree 2 in λ˜ and has the following
two solutions:
λ˜(κ) =
M11 + M22
2
± 1
2
√
(M11 + M22)2 − 4(M11M22 −M12M21)(A.25)
The fastest growing mode (i.e. the value of the wave num-
ber κ with the largest real value Re(λ˜) of λ˜) usually deter-
mines the length scale of the emerging patterns. Consid-
ering (A.16) to (A.19), we can easily see that the largest
value of Re(λ˜) is reached in the limit κ→∞. This is due
to the relationship of success-driven motion with negative
diﬀusion. Hence, the ﬁnally resulting distribution would
be a superposition of delta peaks. As this is not favor-
able from a numerical perspective, the smoothing term
(24) may be added, which implies the additional terms
D0κ
4 in equations (A.16) and (A.19). These terms imply,
in fact, that Re(λ˜) reaches its maximum value for a ﬁnite
value of κ. Note, however, that discrete models involving
success-driven motion also tend to end up with distribu-
tions approximating a superposition of delta peaks [36,37].
When deriving the instability conditions from equation
(A.25) in the following, we will focus on the particularly
interesting case, where the mathematical expression under
the root is non-negative (but the case of a negative value
if 4M12M21 < −(M11−M22)2 could, of course, be treated
as well). It can be shown that λ˜ becomes positive, if one
of the following instability conditions is fulﬁlled:
M11 + M22 > 0 (A.26)
or
M11M22 < M12M21 . (A.27)
In this case, we expect the amplitudes of the small de-
viations δpi(x, t) to grow over time, which gives rise to
spatial pattern formation (such as segregation). Inserting
the abbreviations (A.16) to (A.19), the instability condi-
tions become
[
A11 + (p01P11 −D1)κ2
]
+
[
A22 + (p02P22 −D2)κ2
]
> 0
(A.28)
and
[
A11 + (p01P11 −D1)κ2
][
A22 + (p02P22 −D2)κ2
]
<
(
A12 + p01P12κ
2
)(
A21 + p02P21κ
2
)
. (A.29)
If κ is large enough (i.e. if the related cluster size is suﬃ-
ciently small), the instability conditions (A.28) and (A.29)
simplify to
p01P11 + p
0
2P22 > D1 + D2 (A.30)
and
(p01P11 −D1)(p02P22 −D2) < p01P12p02P21 . (A.31)
These are further discussed in the main text.
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